Homework 2 Solution: Project Independence

AAE 526: Quantitative Methods Fall Semester, 2019

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Due 11 October, 2019

Project Independence for Energy Security (PIES) was an initiative announced by U.S. President Richard Nixon on November 7, 1973, in reaction to the OPEC oil embargo and the resulting 1973 oil crisis. Recalling the Manhattan Project, the stated goal of Project Independence was to achieve energy self-sufficiency for the United States by 1980 through a national commitment to energy conservation and development of alternative sources of energy. Nixon declared that American science, technology and industry could free America from dependence on imported oil (energy independence).

For this homework we implement a stylized PIES model in GAMS and attempt to reproduce results from the paper, "Energy Policy Models for Project Independence" by William Hogan in *Computers and Operations Research* Vol 2, pp 251–271, 1975.

- i. Formulate the prototype PIES model as a quadratic program in GAMS which can produce two equilibria, one without constraints associated with capital or steel and another which accounts for these constraints.
- ii. Reformulate your PIES model as a linear complementarity program in GAMS and demonstrate that you obtain the same results as in the quadratic program.
- iii. Compare your results with those presented in Tables 8 and 9 of Hogan's paper. Can you explain the discrepency?




Fig. A1. Example energy system network.

We begin by choosing notation for sets and parameters. We use the following symbols to represent model dimensions.

```
set
                Consumption regoins /j1, j2/
        j
        i
                Coal regions
                                     /i1, i2/
                Oil regions
                                     /k1, k2/
        k
        r
                Refineries
                                     /r1, r2/
        С
                Supply increments for coal regions /L, M, H/,
        0
                Supply increments for oil regoins /L, H/,
                Energy products
                                         /Coal, Light, Heavy/,
        p
                Grades of refined oil
                                         / Light, Heavy/,
        g(p)
                Resources
                                         /steel, newcap/;
        res
alias (p,pp,ip,jp);
   Next we initialize parameters as data tables from the stylized PIES model described in Hogan's paper:
table table1(i,c,*) Resource requirements for production levels (p 257)
                Production capacity (tons per day)
        cap
        c0
                Minimum price / ton ($)
                New capital / ton
        newcap
                Steel / ton
        steel
        cap
                c0
                        newcap steel
i1.L
        300
                5
                        1
                                 1
i1.M
        300
                6
                        5
                                 2
i1.H
                        10
                                 3
        400
                8
i2.L
        200
                4
                        1
                                 1
i2.M
        300
                5
                        5
                                 4
i2.H
        600
                        6
                                 5;
table table2(i,j) Transport costs ($ per ton)
                        j2
                j1
        i1
                1.00
                        2.50
        i2
                0.75
                        2.75;
table table3(k,o,*) Oil resource requirements
                         c0
                                 newcap steel
                cap
        k1.L
                1100
                                 0
                                         0
        k1.H
                1200
                        1.5
                                 10
                                         4
        k2.L
                1300
                         1.25
                                 0
                                         0
        k2.H
                1100
                        1.50
                                 15
                                         2;
table table4(k,r)
                   Oil transport costs ($ per barrel)
                r1
                        r2
        k1
                2
                        3
        k2
                        2;
table table5(*,r)
                        Refinery yields and cost
                        r1
                                 r2
        Light
                        0.6
                                 0.5
                        0.4
                                 0.5
        Heavy
        cost
                        6.5
                                 5.0;
table table6(r,j) Transport costs for refined products ($ per barrel)
                j1
                        j2
                        1.2
        r1
                1
```

r2

1.5;

```
table table7(p,*) Elasticities of final demand
                RefP
                        RefQ
                                Light
                                                 Coal
                                        Heavv
                        1200
                                                 0.1
               12
                        1000
                                0.1
                                        -0.5
                                                 0.2
        Heavy
        Coal
                        1000
                                        0.2
                                                -0.75;
       table8(p,j) Demand without K or S constraints
table
                   j2
1266
          j1
light
         1252
                   1055
heavy
         1041
                    998
       table9(p,j) Demand with K or S constraints
         1205
                   1229
light
                   1020
heavy
          996
coal
          996
                    910
```

The Demand System

The demand function provided in Table 7 describes an asymmetric demand function of the form:

$$D_i(p) = \bar{q}_i + \sum_j \sigma_{ij} (p_j - \bar{p}_j)$$

in which \bar{p} and \bar{q} correspond to the RefP and RefQ columns in Table 7, and the asymmetric Slutsky matrix, σ , is computed on the basis of the demand elasticity matrix ϵ_{ij} given in Table 7:

$$\sigma_{ij} = \epsilon_{ij} \frac{\bar{q}_i}{\bar{p}_j}$$

In quadratic programming formulation we need an integrable demand function. In this case, we use Slutsky matrix S, a symmetric version of σ :

$$S_{ij} = \frac{\sigma_{ij} + \sigma_{ji}}{2}$$

The calculation of σ , S and S^{-1} is performed in the following GAMS code:

```
parameter
                pref(p)
                                Reference price,
                qref(p)
                                Reference demand;
pref(p) = table7(p, "refp");
qref(p) = table7(p, "refq");
                                Asymmetric slutsky matrix used for the AS model
parameter
                sigma(p,pp)
                                Symmetric slutsky matrix used for CP model;
                slutsky(p,pp)
        Asymmetric demand system:
sigma(p,pp) = table7(p,pp)*qref(p)/pref(pp);
        Related symmetric demand system:
slutsky(p,pp) = 0.5*(sigma(p,pp)+sigma(pp,p));
```

* Calculate the inverse demand coefficients:

```
variable SLUTSKYINV(p,p) Inverse matrix for SLUTSKY;
equation invdef;
invdef(ip,jp).. sum(p, SLUTSKYINV(ip,p)*slutsky(p,jp)) =e= 1$sameas(ip,jp);
model invert /invdef/;
solve invert using mcp;
```

Representation of the Network

It is helpful to initially approach the model formulation from a linear programming perspective, taking final demand as given. This permits us to see that we have the network logic in place without having to worry about the representation of demand functions through the quadratic form in the objective function. In the LP model we simply minimize the cost of meeting demand as reported in table8. The equations incorporate parameters which are not employed in the LP solution but which are required subsequently. These include a demand adjustment term (delta) and resource supply constraints (rs). We use the resource supply parameter to control whether the resource constraint enters the model. When rs (res) =0, the constraint for resource res is omitted.

The demand function associated with the symmetric Slutsky matrix is:

$$\hat{D}_i(p) = \bar{q}_i + \sum_j S_{ij} (p_j - \bar{p}_j)$$

and the inverse demand function associated with the symmetric Slutsky matrix is:

$$P_i(q) = \bar{p}_i + \sum_{i} S_{ij}^{-1} (q_j - \bar{q}_j)$$

Asymmetric demand may then be written as:

$$D_i(p) = \hat{D}_i(p) + \Delta_i$$

We Δ_i is assigned to the difference between $D_i(p)$ and $\hat{D}_i(p)$, the symmetric model lines up with the asymmetric model. Below we use this observation to implement a *diagonalization* strategy for solving the market equilibrium model with asymmetric demand through a sequence of quadratic programming problems.

```
parameter
                delta(p,j)
                                Demand adjustment (off-diagonal terms),
                                Resource supply,
                rs(res)
                resutil
                                Resource utilization.
                                Pivot report data,
                report
                                Flag for the diagonal own-price demand model (QP or MCP) /1/
                σo
                                Flag for symmetric cross-price demand model (QP or MCP) /0/
                ср
                                Flag for the asymmetric cross-price demand model (MCP) /0/;
                as
rs(res) = 0;
delta(p,j) = 0;
NONNEGATIVE
VARIABLES
        QC(i.c)
                        Quantity of coal extracted by region i at cost level c,
                        Quantity of oil resources extracted -- region k at cost level o
        QO(k,o)
        QR(r)
                        Quantity of oil refined -- refinery r,
        D(p,j)
                        Demand -- energy product p in consumption region j,
        XC(i,j)
                        Quantity of coal transported from region i to market j
        XO(k,r)
                        Quantity of oil resources shipped from region k to refinery r
        XR(r,g,j)
                        Quantity of oil grade g transported from refinery r to market j;
```

```
COST
variable
                                                                               Total cost;
                                        oilresource, crudeoil, refinedoil, coalsupply, demand, costdef, resource;
equations
                    Oil supply from region (k) by cost increment (o) equals oil shipments to refineries (r):
oilresource(k).. sum(o, QO(k,o)) = g = sum(r, XO(k,r));
                    Oil supply from regions (k) equals refinery (r) output:
crudeoil(r).. sum(k, XO(k,r)) = g = QR(r);
                    Refined oil supply equals refined oil shipments:
refinedoil(r,g).. QR(r)*table5(g,r) = g = sum(j, XR(r,g,j));
                    Coal supply equals coal demand:
coalsupply(i).. sum(c, QC(i,c)) =g= sum(j, XC(i,j));
 \\ \text{demand(j,p)..} \quad \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j)) + sum(i, XC(i,j))} \\ \text{sameas(p,"coal") = g= D(p,j) + delta(p,j); } \\ \text{demand(j,p)..} \quad \\ \text{demand(j,p)..} \quad \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j)) + sum(i, XC(i,j))} \\ \text{sameas(p,"coal") = g= D(p,j) + delta(p,j); } \\ \text{demand(j,p)..} \quad \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j)) + sum(i, XC(i,j))} \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j)) + sum(i, XR(r,g,j))} \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j))} \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j)) + sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j))} \\ \text{sum((r,g(p)), XR(r,g,j)) + sum((
resource(res)$rs(res).. rs(res) = g= sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC(i,c)) +
                                                                                          sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO(k,o));
costdef..
                                        COST =e=
                                                                 sum((r,g,j), XR(r,g,j)*table6(r,j)) +
                                                                 sum((k,r),
                                                                                                XO(k,r)*table4(k,r)) +
                                                                                                 XC(i,j)*table2(i,j)) +
                                                                 sum((i,j),
                                                                 sum((k,o),
                                                                                                 QO(k,o)*table3(k,o,"c0")) +
                                                                 sum((i,c),
                                                                                                 QC(i,c)*table1(i,c,"c0")) +
                                                                                                 QR(r)*table5("cost",r));
                                                                 sum(r,
                    Upper bounds on coal and oil production:
QC.UP(i,c) = table1(i,c,"cap");
QO.UP(k,o) = table3(k,o,"cap");
                    Solve the model as a linear program with fixed product demand
                    in each market and no resource constraints:
D.FX(p,j) = table8(p,j);
model pies_lp /all/;
solve pies_lp using LP minimizing COST;
report("price",p,j,"LP") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"LP") = D.1(p,j);
resutil(res,"LP") = sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC.L(i,c)) +
                                                           sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO.L(k,o));
report("price",p,j,"LP") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"LP") = D.1(p,j);
```

Two Integrable Demand Models

The next step in the computations is to add the quadratic term representing consumer surplus to the object function. This code includes two alternative demand functions, one based on the symmetric demand system with own- and cross-price effects (the *cross-price model*, cp), the other based on a diagonal demand function in

which cross-price effects are assumed to be zero (the own-price model, op).

```
$macro CS_op(p,j)
                        (D(p,j)*(pref(p) + 1/sigma(p,p) * (D(p,j)/2-qref(p))))
                        (D(p,j)*(pref(p) + sum(pp, slutskyinv.L(p,pp) * (D(pp,j)/2-qref(pp)))))
$macro CS_cp(p,j)
variable
                NSS
                        Negative of social surplus;
equation
                nssdef:
                NSS = e = COST - sum((p,j), CS_op(p,j)$op + CS_cp(p,j)$cp);
nssdef..
model pies_qcp /all/;
        Solve the model with own-price demand function, ignoring
        cross-price effects:
op = yes;
cp = no;
as = no;
delta(p,j) = 0;
D.UP(p,j) = +inf;
D.LO(p,j) = 0;
rs(res) = 0;
solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
resutil(res,"op") = sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC.L(i,c)) +
                                sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO.L(k,o));
report("price",p,j,"op") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"op") = D.1(p,j);
        Solve the market equilibrium with symmetric cross-price demand:
op = no;
cp = yes;
as = no;
delta(p,j) = 0;
D.UP(p,j) = +inf;
D.LO(p,j) = 0;
rs(res) = 0;
solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
resutil(res,"cp") = sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC.L(i,c)) +\\
                                sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO.L(k,o));
report("price",p,j,"cp") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"cp") = D.1(p,j);
```

The Complementarity Model

As a cross check on the consumer surplus calculation we formulate the model as a complementarity problem. The complementarity problem shares the primal constraints with the optimization problem. In addition, it includes arbitrage conditions – dual feasibility constraints from the linear programming model and it incorporates an explicit primal demand function. Three alternative demand functions are included in the model. D_op defines the *own-price* (diagonal) demand in which the demand for product p depends only on the price of product p. D_cp defines the *symmetric cross-price* demand function in which the demand for product p depends on the prices of all goods as defined by parameter slutsky(p,pp). Finally, D_as defines the *asymmetric cross-price* demand function as defined by sigma(p,pp).

In a complementarity problem equations are associated with variables, and complementary slackness conditions require that when a variable is off its bounds, the corresponding equation is binding. The equation-variable

associations are defined in the model pies_mcp statement.

```
NONNEGATIVE VARIABLES
       P_0(k)
                       Supply price of oil,
       P_XO(r)
                       Delivered price of oil,
       P_R(r,g)
                       Price of refinery outputs,
       P_C(i)
                       Supply price of coal,
                       Demand price of all products (oil and coal)
       P_D(j,p)
       PR(res)
                       Resource price;
equations
       prf_QC(i,c)
                                Quantity of coal extracted by region i at cost level c,
       prf_Q0(k,o)
                                Quantity of oil resources extracted -- region k at cost level o
       prf_QR(r)
                               Quantity of oil refined -- refinery r,
       def_D(p,j)
                               Demand -- energy product p in consumption region j,
       prf_XR(r,g,j)
                               Quantity of oil transported from refinery r to market j
       prf_XC(i,j)
                               Quantity of coal transported from region i to market j
       prf_XO(k,r)
                               Quantity of oil resources shipped from region k to refinery r
       coalprice(j,p)
                               Coal price constraint;
                       table1(i,c,"c0") + sum(res,PR(res)*table1(i,c,res)) =e= P_C(i);
prf_QC(i,c)..
                       table3(k,o,"c0") + sum(res,PR(res)*table3(k,o,res)) = e = P_0(k);
prf_Q0(k,o)..
                       P_XO(r) + table5("cost",r) = g = sum(g,P_R(r,g)*table5(g,r));
prf_QR(r)..
                       P_R(r,g) + table6(r,j) = g = P_D(j,g);
prf_XR(r,g,j)..
                       P_C(i) + table2(i,j) =G= P_D(j,"coal");
prf_XC(i,j)..
prf_XO(k,r)..
                       P_0(k) + table4(k,r) = G = P_X0(r);
       Define the own-price demand function:
D_{p,j,price} = (qref(p) + slutsky(p,p)*(price(j,p)-pref(p)))
       Define the symmetric cross-price demand function:
$macro D_cp(p,j,price) (qref(p) + sum(pp, slutsky(p,pp)*(price(j,pp)-pref(pp))))
       Define the asymmetric cross-price demand function:
$macro D_as(p,j,price) (qref(p) + sum(pp, sigma(p,pp)*(price(j,pp)-pref(pp))))
def_D(p,j)..
               D(p,j) = e = D_op(p,j,P_D) + D_cp(p,j,P_D) + D_as(p,j,P_D) 
model pies_mcp /
        oilresource.P_O, crudeoil.P_XO, refinedoil.P_R, coalsupply.P_C, demand.P_D,
       prf_QC.QC, prf_QO.QO, prf_QR.QR, def_D.D, prf_XR.XR, prf_XC.XC, prf_XO.XO,
        resource.PR /;
```

After the complementarity problem is defined, it can be used to verify that the equilibrium found through social surplus optimization solves the corresponding MCP model. We do this check both for the own-price demand system (op = yes) and for the symmetric cross-price model (cp = yes).

```
op = yes;
cp = no;
as = no;
delta(p,j) = 0;
solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
```

```
PR.FX(res) = 0;
P_O.L(k) = oilresource.M(k);
P_XO.L(r) = crudeoil.M(r);
P_R.L(r,g) = refinedoil.M(r,g);
P_C.L(i) = coalsupply.m(i);
P_D.L(j,p) = demand.M(j,p);
pies_mcp.iterlim = 0;
solve pies_mcp using mcp;
abort$round(pies_mcp.objval) "MCP fails to replicate the QP model (own-price demand)";
op = no;
cp = yes;
as = no;
delta(p,j) = 0;
solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
PR.FX(res) = 0;
P_O.L(k) = oilresource.M(k);
P_X0.L(r) = crudeoil.M(r);
P_R.L(r,g) = refinedoil.M(r,g);
P_C.L(i) = coalsupply.m(i);
P_D.L(j,p) = demand.M(j,p);
pies_mcp.iterlim = 0;
solve pies_mcp using mcp;
abort$round(pies_mcp.objval) "MCP fails to replicate the QP model (cross-price demand)";
```

Diagonalization

A diagonalization algorithm involves solving a nonlinear system of equations of the form:

$$x = f(x)$$

through iterative assignment for iterations k = 1, 2, ...

$$x^{k+1} = f(x^k)$$

We can use diagonalization to find Δ through the iterations:

- i. Compute prices through solution of the quadratic program, implicitly compute $p^{k+1} = f(\Delta^k)$
- ii. Re-compute the demand function perturbation, i.e. $\Delta^{k+1} = D(p^{k+1}) \hat{D}(p^{k+1})$
- iii. Stop when $\delta^k = ||\Delta^{k+1} \Delta^k||$ is smaller than a given tolerance τ

The following GAMS codes implements this diagonalization algorithm using the own-price demand system:

```
iterlog(iter,j) = sum(p, sqr(delta(p,j) - (D_as(p,j,demand.M) - D.L(p,j))));
        delta(p,j) = D_as(p,j,demand.M) - D.L(p,j);
        solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
        dev = sum(p,iterlog(iter,p)) + sum(j,iterlog(iter,j));
display "Iteration log with diagonal (own-price) demand system:", iterlog;
        392 Iteration log with diagonal (own-price) demand system:
        392 PARAMETER iterlog Iteration log for iterative demand adjustments
                                      Coal
                j1
                            j2
                                                  Light
                                                              Heavy
iter0
          1496.372
                      1080.593
                                    86.203
                                               1331.809
                                                           1158.953
          7202.339
                      2822.173
                                               199.765
                                  3632.534
                                                           6192.213
iter1
          1674.564
                      1570.186
                                   930.695
                                               2027.999
                                                            286.056
iter2
iter3
           316.545
                       301.256
                                   204.064
                                               169.929
                                                            243.808
iter4
            29.783
                        28.784
                                     9.871
                                                 30.839
                                                             17.857
iter5
             0.442
                         0.464
                                     0.005
                                                  0.146
                                                              0.755
iter6
             0.017
                         0.018
                                     0.009
                                                 0.022
                                                              0.004
iter7
             0.002
                         0.002 9.588287E-4
                                                  0.002
                                                              0.001
iter8 2.883785E-4 2.908058E-4 1.426338E-4 2.506698E-4 1.858807E-4
iter9 4.106105E-5 4.142413E-5 2.025582E-5 3.508095E-5 2.714841E-5
iter10 5.871390E-6 5.922886E-6 2.897648E-6 5.030134E-6 3.866495E-6
```

The symmetric cross-price model defined by slutsky is a closer approximation to the asymmetric cross-price model defined by sigma, and when this model is used, convergence of the diagonalization algorithm is considerably quicker:

```
iterlog(iter,p) = 0;
iterlog(iter,j) = 0;
delta(p,j) = 0;
op = no;
cp = yes;
as = no;
dev = 1;
loop(iter$round(dev, 4),
        iterlog(iter,p) = sum(j, \ sqr(delta(p,j) - (D_as(p,j,demand.M) - D.L(p,j))));\\
        iterlog(iter,j) = sum(p, sqr(delta(p,j) - (D_as(p,j,demand.M) - D.L(p,j))));
        delta(p,j) = D_as(p,j,demand.M) - D.L(p,j);
        solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
        dev = sum(p,iterlog(iter,p)) + sum(j,iterlog(iter,j));
);
display "Iteration log with symmetric cross-price demand system:", iterlog;
        417 Iteration log with symmetric cross-price demand system:
        417 PARAMETER iterlog Iteration log for iterative demand adjustments
               j1
                           j2
                                      Coal
                                                 Light
                                                             Heavy
        18398.117
                     9330.138
                                 9726.247
                                             11242.314
                                                          6759.693
iter0
iter1
        19386.580
                    10155.725
                                 11656.915
                                              4433.775
                                                         13451.615
iter2
           37.187
                       37.750
                                     0.931
                                                61.491
                                                            12.515
            0.051
                        0.034
                                     0.003
                                                 0.044
                                                             0.038
iter3
iter4 8.421629E-6 5.469478E-6 1.634557E-7 1.153012E-5 2.197526E-6
```

We verify that the equilibrium returned through diagonalization solves the corresponding complementarity model based on the asymmetric demand model.

```
op = no;
cp = no;
as = yes;

D.L(p,j) = D_as(p,j,demand.M);

delta(p,j) = 0;

PR.FX(res) = 0;
P_O.L(k) = oilresource.M(k);
P_XO.L(r) = crudeoil.M(r);
P_R.L(r,g) = refinedoil.M(r,g);
P_C.L(i) = coalsupply.m(i);
P_D.L(j,p) = demand.M(j,p);

pies_mcp.iterlim = 0;
solve pies_mcp using mcp;
abort$round(pies_mcp.objval) "MCP fails to replicate asymmetric equilibrium.";
```

Resource Constraints on Steel and New Capital

Finally, we install constraints on steel and new capital through assignment of parameter rs (res) and solve the model through diagonalization.

```
rs("steel") = 12000;
rs("newcap") = 35000;
op = yes;
cp = no;
as = no;
              = 0;
delta(p,j)
solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
resutil(res,"con_op") = sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC.L(i,c)) +
                        sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO.L(k,o));
report("price",p,j,"con_op") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"con_op") = D.1(p,j);
op = no;
cp = yes;
as = no;
              = 0;
delta(p,j)
solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
resutil(res,"con\_cp") = sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC.L(i,c)) +\\
                        sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO.L(k,o));
report("price",p,j,"con_cp") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"con_cp") = D.1(p,j);
        Solve the QP model iteratively with cross-price elasticities of demand:
op = no;
cp = yes;
as = no;
dev = 1;
iterlog(iter,p) = 0;
iterlog(iter,j) = 0;
loop(iter$round(dev, 4),
```

```
delta(p,j) = D_as(p,j,demand.M) - D.L(p,j);
       solve pies_qcp using QCP minimizing NSS;
       dev = sum(p,iterlog(iter,p)) + sum(j,iterlog(iter,j));
display "Iteration log with resource constraints:", iterlog;
resutil(res,"iter_con") = sum((i,c), table1(i,c,res)*QC.L(i,c)) +
                             sum((k,o), table3(k,o,res)*QO.L(k,o));
report("price",p,j,"iter_con") = demand.m(j,p);
report("quantity",p,j,"iter_con") = D.1(p,j) + delta(p,j);
report("delta\%",p,j,"iter\_con") = 100 * delta(p,j) / (D.l(p,j) + delta(p,j));
       Verify consistency with the MCP model:
op = no;
cp = no;
as = yes;
D.L(p,j) = D_as(p,j,demand.M);
delta(p,j) = 0;
PR.UP(res) = +inf;
PR.L(res) = resource.M(res);
P_O.L(k) = oilresource.M(k);
P_XO.L(r) = crudeoil.M(r);
P_R.L(r,g) = refinedoil.M(r,g);
P_C.L(i) = coalsupply.m(i);
P_D.L(j,p) = demand.M(j,p);
pies_mcp.iterlim = 0;
solve pies_mcp using mcp;
abort$round(pies_mcp.objval) "MCP fails to replicate constrained equilibrium.";
option resutil:1;
display resutil;
option report:2:2:1;
display report;
```

Replication of Hogan's Results

The equilibrium demand quantities do not agree with the values reported by Hogan in Tables 8 and 9.

	528 PARAMETER	resutil	Resource utilization									
	LP	op	ср	iter_op	iter_cp	con_op	con_cp	iter_con				
steel	13156.0	13500.0	13286.2	13327.7	13327.7	12000.0	12000.0	12000.0				
newcap	38740.0	39600.0	39065.6	39169.3	39169.3	35000.0	35000.0	35000.0				
531 PARAMETER report Pivot report data												
INDEX 1 = price												
	LP	C	ор ср	iter_op	iter_cp	con_op	con_cp	iter_con				
Coal .j1	9.00	10.4	10 9.03	9.20	9.20	11.52	11.60	11.64				
Coal .j2	10.50	12.0	00 10.78	10.97	10.97	13.52	13.60	13.64				
Light.j1	12.40	13.7	12.40	11.98	11.98	15.63	15.70	15.75				
Light.j2	12.60	13.9	12.60	12.32	12.32	15.83	15.90	15.95				

Heavy.j1 Heavy.j2	8.60 9.10	10.10 10.60	8.60 9.10	9.02 9.52	9.02 9.52	11.67 12.17	11.80 12.30	11.85 12.35
INDEX 1 = c	quantity							
	LP	op	ср	iter_op	iter_cp	con_op	con_cp	iter_con
Coal .j1	1102.00	1100.00	1100.00	1100.00	1100.00	1030.16	1019.33	1018.11
Coal .j2	998.00	1000.00	1000.00	1000.00	1000.00	905.16	904.29	902.69
Light.j1	1252.00	1285.77	1266.21	1263.30	1263.30	1213.92	1205.44	1202.55
Light.j2	1266.00	1277.07	1279.56	1278.20	1278.20	1206.42	1220.75	1225.05
Heavy.j1	1041.00	1078.99	1044.84	1052.34	1052.34	1013.55	997.76	998.97
Heavy.j2	1055.00	1058.16	1055.95	1063.09	1063.09	992.71	1012.89	1012.72
INDEX 1 = c	delta%							
	iter_op	iter_cp	iter_con					
Coal .j1	-6.80	0.69	0.05					
Coal .j2	-6.43	0.69	9.377400E-3					
Light.j1	-6.93	-2.04	-0.14					
Light.j2	-4.68	-1.48	0.45					
Heavy.j1	-6.82	2.63	0.17					
Heavy.i2	-3.78	2.38	0.03					